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PREEMPTION AND STATE ANTI-REDLINING
REGULATIONS: THE NEED FOR
CLARIFICATION
Marianne M. Jennings*
I. Introduction
The phenomenon of continuous decline plagues our urban areas. In
particular, residential neighborhoods in many large cities are
deteriorating progressively with no signs of reconstruction or
revitalization.' The responsibility for these decaying inner cities lies,
in part, with the lending practices of local financial institutions.2 The
refusal to lend money for the purchase or improvement of these
* Associate Professor of Business Administration, College of Business Administra-
tion, Arizona State University. B.S. 1974, Brigham Young University, J.D. 1977,
Brigham Young School of Law. Member Arizona Bar Association.
1. Weinstein & Clark, The Fiscal Outlook for Growing Cities, in URBAN GOVERN-
MENT FINANCE: EMERGING TRENDS 105 (R. Bahl ed. 1981); Note, Municipal Blight
Declarations, 23 URB. L. ANN. 423 (1982) ("Blight" is described as a process of
deterioration characterized by substandard housing, abandoned structures and un-
derutilization of properties).
2. See 1,600 From Ethnic Groups Protest Against Institutions They Say Are De-
stroying Central Cities, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1972, at 29, col. 1. "Financial
institutions" is a broad term which will be used throughout this Article to represent
the several types of lenders which make mortgage loans. These include: savings and
loan associations, commercial banks, mutual savings associations, mortgage compan-
ies, life insurance companies, credit unions, and federal, state and local finance
agencies. As of September, 1979, over $608.3 billion was invested in the mortgage
market. L. VIDGER, BORROWING AND LENDING ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 20 (1981).
Savings and loan associations accounted for an estimated $387.3 billion. Id. The
two primary functions performed by savings and loans are: (1) to promote savings by
the payment of interest to savers and (2) to finance residential property. According to
one savings and loan official: "if the home financing element were eliminated from
savings and loan activity and the general investment market were made its province,
there probably would not be so great an economic and social justification for the
existence of these associations." L. KENDALL, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BUSINESS: ITS
PURPOSES, FUNCTIONS, AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION (1962), reprinted in H. HUTCHE-
SON, MONEY, BANKING AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 44 (4th ed. 1980).
Commercial banks represent the second greatest source of residential financing-
approximately $142 billion-however, mortgage financing constitutes only a small
portion of their activity. L. VIDGER, supra, at 20. Commercial banks form the
underpinnings of the American economy by offering demand deposits or checking
accounts. Essentially commercial banks create money. The basic definition of the
United States money supply-M,-consists of demand deposit liabilities of commer-
cial banks plus coins and currency issued by the Treasury Department. Thus banks
finance business, agriculture and the government as well as individuals seeking
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properties eliminates any hope or opportunity for neighborhood
improvement. 3 Ultimately, by withholding mortgage financing,
financial institutions virtually control the racial structure and destiny
of a neighborhood. 4
residential mortgages. See generally P. HORVITZ, MONrTARY POLICY AND THE FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1979) (in depth discussion of banks' role in finance);
H. HUTCHESON, supra (provides banking history).
Mutual savings banks, like savings and loan associations, were established to
encourage thrift. They differ from savings and loans structurally. Mutual savings
banks do not have stockholders and their net earnings are paid to depositors, while
savings and loans are owned by shareholders and net earnings are paid to those
shareholders. Moreover, mutual savings banks lend money for residential mortgages
on a national scale through government supported loan programs. Savings and loans,
on the other hand, generally make their loans to local individuals. See generally J.
BOYKIN, FINANCING REAL ESTATE (1979) (details mortgage financing sources); H.
RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1960) (sets forth the role of savings and
loan associations in home financing); L. VIDGER, supra (discusses providers of mort-
gage funds).
Each of these types of financial institutions is further differentiated in that it is
chartered- authorized to do business-by either the state in which it is situated or by
the federal government. This dual chartering system is discussed at note 12 infra.
3. Specific stages of the declining process have been described as follows:
(1) middle class whites depart and the neighborhood's socioeconomic status
declines;
(2) new urban dwellers move in, creating racial or ethnic changes;
(3) property speculation and exploitation begins;
(4) weakened market conditions set in-a "crisis ghetto" emerges;
(5) disinvestment occurs.
R. DEVINE, W. RENNIE & N. SIMS, WHERE THE LENDER LOOKS FIRST: A CASE STUDY OF
MORTGAGE DISINVESTMENT IN BRONX COUNTY 1960-1970, at 3 (1974), reprinted in
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1329 (1975) (citing
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF HOUSING ABANDONMENT 1
(1972)). See RED-LINING ON MILWAUKEE's WESTSIDE, A REPORT BY THE REINVESTMENT
COMMITTEE OF MILWAUKEE ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED CITIZENS, reprinted in Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 293, 295-99 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as MILWAUKEE ALLIANCE].
4. More loans are made in greater amounts in suburban areas populated by
whites. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 536-38 (1975)
(statement of Edward L. Holmgren, Dir. of Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination in
Housing) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Hearings on S. 1281]. Numerous studies con-
ducted by both federal agencies and private organizations have confirmed this dis-
proportion in lending. The most thorough compilation of data and statistical analysis
is contained in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
hearings on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. Sen. Hearings on S. 1281,
supra. See also URBAN-SUBURBAN INVESTMENT STUDY GROUP, CENTER FOR URBAN
STUDIES OF THE UNIV. OF ILLINOIS, REDLINING AND DISINVESTMENT AS A DISCRIMINA-
TORY PRACTICE IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS (1977) (three part study prepared by
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Using race, geographic location or status as criteria for determining
whether to grant a mortgage is a form of discrimination 5 referred to as
"redlining."' ' Municipal,7 State,8 and Federal' statutes have been
the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development) [hereinafter cited as URBAN-
SUBURBAN STUDY GROUP]; R. DEVINE, W. RENNIE & N. SIMS, supra note 3, at 1267;
R. SCHAFER & H. LADD, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACCESSIBILITY TO MORTGAGE
FUNDS BY WOMEN AND MINORITIES (Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and
Harvard 1980) (data on lending practices in California and New York).
There have been, however, studies indicating race as an insignificant factor in the
decision to grant or deny a mortgage. See, e.g., R. ALBRANDT, JR., MORTGAGE
LENDING IN PITTSBURGH (Action Housing, Inc. Public Policy Monograph No. 6,
1975); G. BENSTON, D. HORSKY & H. WEINGARTNER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MORT-
GAGE REDLINING (1978) (prepared for Salomon Brothers Center for the study of
financial institutions). One study conducted in 1978 revealed that low income neigh-
borhoods with relatively few single-family owner occupied dwellings had fewer and
smaller mortgage loans. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 29, 1978, § 5, at 1, col. 2. By
contrast, more and larger mortgage loans were found in areas with higher median
incomes and a higher number of single-family owner occupied dwellings. Race was
determined to be an insignificant factor. Id. Although some controversy exists as to
the specific determinants responsible for the unavailability of mortgage funds, it is
certain that the lack of funds for the purchase and improvement of homes results in
urban decline. For a complete bibliography of material related to discriminatory
lending practices see D. LISTOKIN & S. CASEY, MORTGAGE LENDING & RACE (1980);
R. SCHAFER, MORTGAGE LENDING DECISIONS: CRITERIA AND CONSTRAINTS (1978).
5. The discrimination referred to here is in blanket form. Unlike conventional
discrimination against an individual, an entire neighborhood is the victim. The race
or ethnic character of the applicant is irrelevant to the arbitrary denial of mortgage
financing. It should be noted that Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619 (1976)), specifically prohibits discrimination based upon
race, religion or national origin. See United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate
Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (42 U.S.C. § 3613 governs discrimina-
tory appraisal practices); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (plaintiff entitled to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 3605 for
discrimination in financial assistance in housing).
6. The term "redlining" is pejorative, originating in the practice of physically
drawing a red line on a map around an area perceived to pose a high financial risk.
Ryan, Redlining, 1977 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 57 (1977). The definition of redlining
varies. Broadly described, redlining is "credit discrimination based upon the charac-
teristics of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower's dwelling." Conference of
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), affd mem.,
445 U.S. 921 (1980).
Many commentators emphasize that the refusal to grant mortgages and home
improvement loans is "systematic." MILWAUKEE ALLIANCE, supra note 3, at 293-94.
Other writers highlight the arbitrary nature of the practice. See URBAN-SUBURBAN
STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 8. In light of the great deal of attention focused on the
practice, it has been aptly noted that:
The word "redlining" has gotten to be what lawyers call a "word of art."
It has different meanings for different people. It's shorthand for a refusal
to lend money or invest in areas because of the presence of certain crite-
ria-be it age of the homes, racial composition of the neighborhood,
income level of the residents or any such similar arbitrary grounds. It is the
making of loan underwriting judgments on selected areas, without rigor-
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enacted in an effort to curb this discriminatory practice. One aspect of
these statutes is procedural, requiring financial institutions to disclose
ous individual analysis necessary for such decisions. Redlining has a de-
structive consequence-disinvestment.
D. Searing, Credit Disinvestment and Redlining 1-2 (paper prepared for presentation
at the Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination in Housing, Midwest Regional Housing
Conference, Jan. 29-30, 1974 Chicago, I11.).
The distinction between "redlining" and "disinvestment" is a fine one. Redlining
refers specifically to the practice of denying mortgage funds to a particular region
such as an inner city residential area. Disinvestment, however, embodies the collec-
tion of funds in one neighborhood through savings deposits and then investing those
funds in a different locale, i.e., using the savings of local urban residents to make
loans for homes in the suburbs or in another state. The sun belt-Florida, Georgia
and Texas-was built in part from funds disinvested from northern urban centers. D.
LISTOKIN & S. CASEY, supra note 4, at 7.
Two methods of redlining exist. The first is the open refusal to consider and grant
loans for a particular community. The second and more subtle method is to arbitrar-
ily vary the loan application procedures or the terms of the loan agreement. This can
take many forms. These indirect methods include: decreasing the mortgage term;
raising the interest rate; requiring a larger downpayment; raising closing costs;
refusing to approve loans for less than a minimum amount; lowering the percentage
of appraised value for which the loan will be issued or under-appraising the prop-
erty; requiring the outstanding principal of a balloon mortgage to be paid immedi-
ately rather than extending the loan; charging "up front" fees to the applicant; and
enforcing a "due on sale clause" rather than permitting an assumption of the mort-
gage by the new owner. See Werner, Frej & Madway, Redlining and Disinvestment:
Causes, Consequences and Proposed Remedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 501, 502
(1977).
Redlining has the effect of perpetuating residential segregation. In 1972, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development found that 18 % (1,000 institutions)
of selected lending institutions in the United States admitted to considering a neigh-
borhood's racial or ethnic character in evaluating loan applications. URBAN-SUBUR-
BAN STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 7, 25, 106. Furthermore, redlining in interracial
areas contributes to the destabilization and decline of the neighborhood. See M.
STECMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE: A
STUDY OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 1968-70 (1972).
The most troubling aspect of redlining is that it constitutes a self-fulfilling proph-
esy. Senator William Proxmire appropriately stated:
When lenders systematically restrict mortgage credit in a so-called declin-
ing neighborhood, their fears can become a self-fulfilling reality. Home-
owners move out; new ones can't move in. The community goes into a
tailspin, with the ultimate result that sound existing housing prematurely
deteriorates and the community dies a premature death.
Sen. Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 4, at 1 (opening remarks).
7. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-30 to 7-36 (1974); MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, §§ 139.40G, 141.50J (1982); CLEVELAND, OHIO
ADMIN. CODE §§ 127.34-127.36, at 60-61 (1975); District of Columbia Resolution to
Create a Commission on Residential Mortgage Investments (investigatory purposes
only); see Toward a Local Partnership for Neighborhood Reinvestment Commission
(1978) (results of the District of Columbia Commission).
8. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, Subch. 23, § 245.2 (1976); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35854 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 201
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periodically certain loan data to enable regulatory agencies to discover
the occurrence of redlining. 10 In some instances the laws contain
substantive anti-redlining provisions. 1'
There are two categories of lending institutions to be
regulated-those chartered locally by the individual state and those
chartered nationally by the federal government.12 The state and
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977), invalidated in Glen Ellyn Sav. & Loan v. Tsoumas, 71111.
2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
17, §§ 851-855 (Smith-Hurd 1981); Mass. Comm'r of Banks Disclosure Directive
(Ref. No. 18-26); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 155, § 1 (West Supp. 1982); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167, § 7 (West Supp. 1982); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
445.1601 to .1609 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F (West Supp.
1982-1983); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9f (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); NEW YonK SUPER-
visoRY PRocEDuP G-107 (promulgated pursuant to N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 10, 36(1),
36(3), 125(2) (McKinney 1971)); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 135.07 (Page 1969); Wis.
ADMIN. CODE ch. S-L 27.01 to .05 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat.
1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147, amended by Pub. L.
No. 95-630, § 1502, 92 Stat. 3713 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp.
V 1981)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 88 Stat. 1521,
amended by Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); 12 C.F.R. §§ 528, 531.8 (1982).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); id. § 2903 (Supp. V 1981). See notes
43-62 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 71, 74, 75, 85, 91 & 100 infra.
12. The United States employs a dual banking system. Banking charters are issued
by both state and federal governments. The charter authorizes the operation of the
institution.
In the 1780's, states first began to charter banking companies. By 1791, the federal
government chartered the first national bank. National banks were insignificant until
the mid-19th century when Congress passed the National Bank Act of 1863. 12 Stat.
665 (1863). The National Bank Act authorized the establishment of nationally char-
tered institutions to be regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. This
federal act did not, however, abolish state chartered banks. Thus, the two have
coexisted for over a century. Today, national banks are still subject to regulation by
the Comptroller of the Currency, an office of the Treasury Department. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 21, 481 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). State banks are subject to regulation by the
state banking commission or its equivalent. The Federal Reserve Board also regulates
banks belonging to that system. Id. § 248(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Membership is
mandatory for national banks but optional for state banks. Additionally, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) exerts control over certain banks. Id. §§
1815-1820 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Federal Reserve Members (all federally chartered
and some state chartered banks) must have Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
insurance. Id. § 1814. FDIC insurance is voluntary for other banks. Id. § 1815.
The dual chartering system also exists among savings and loan associations. Thus,
while some savings and loans are chartered by the state in which they are located,
other savings and loans are chartered and regulated by the Federal Savings and Loan
Association. Id. § 1464 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See notes 23-24 infra and accompany-
ing text. Moreover, for federally chartered savings and loans, insurance from the
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federal laws and regulations, passed to monitor and eliminate
redlining, 13 give rise to an important issue: with which statutory
requirement a federally chartered financial institution must comply.
This conflict is exacerbated because these regulations impose
hardships on the institutions; therefore, voluntary compliance is
extremely unlikely. The question of which set of statutes is applicable
to which lending institution has not only caused confusion, but has
diminished the force and effectiveness of anti-redlining legislation. 14
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is obligatory. It is evident that
there are a number of regulatory agencies involved in the banking industry.
Criticisms of the complex dual system include allegations that it is an arrangement
where banks "play off" one regulatory authority against another, to evade regula-
tions implemented at either the federal or state level. H. HUTCHESON, supra note 2, at
83 (quoting W. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 59
(1968)).
Supporters of the dual system, however, assert that it is an escape valve from
arbitrary or discriminatory chartering or regulatory policies by state and federal
authorities. Id. See generally P. HORVITZ, supra note 2 (history and examination of
American banking system); T. MAYER, J. DUESENBERRY& R. ALIBER, MONEY, BANK-
ING, AND THE ECONOMY (1981) (analysis of banking industry).
The dual system creates a complex intertwining of state and federal law. Four
categories of relationships between federal and state regulations exist: (1) federal
domination, where a federal rule applies to both state and national entities; (2)
overlap, where an institution must comply with both state and federal regulations;
(3) independence, where a federal rule applies to a national institution and a state
rule applies to a state institution; and (4) state domination, where a state law governs
both state and national institutions. See Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and
Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687, 688 (1980).
13. See generally Sen. Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 4 (testimony of advocates
of anti-redlining legislation). Representing the United States Conference of Mayors,
Kenneth Gibson, Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, described the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act as "an essential first step in winning the war against investment
malpractice." Id. at 1023.
14. A state legislature which desires to impose disclosure requirements which are
significantly more stringent than those established under the federal law will face
considerable opposition since national institutions will not be required to comply and
thus may enjoy an advantage over state chartered institutions.
The financial cost of compliance with the disclosure mandates was an important
issue in the congressional debates over the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
(HMDA). One Congresswoman estimated that " 'providing the loan information
would add $1 million a year to the operating costs of all affected associations.' "H.R.
REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975) (statement of Rep. Millicent Fenwick,
quoting Tom Scott, Jr.).
In the Senate, concern for the burden which these requirements would impose on
smaller institutions without access to computer systems led to the suggestion that
HMDA should be a three-year demonstration study applicable only to twenty metro-
politan areas. 121 CONG. REC. 19,683 (1975) (suggested amendment by Sen. Garn).
ANTI-REDLINING REGULATION
Essentially the question to be addressed is whether the federal
statutory scheme has preempted15 the field of redlining legislation. In
other words, are states foreclosed from legislating against redlining?
Resolution of a federal preemption issue requires an examination of
the legislative intent and subsequent judicial construction of the
relevant federal statutes. Additionally the purpose and effect of the
state laws must be analyzed.
This Article will set forth certain federal, state and municipal
anti-redlining laws and discuss the conflicting decisions concerning
the proper application of these laws. The need for clarification of
federal and state roles in the anti-redlining field will be set forth and
recommendations for the most effective means by which to
accomplish this goal will be offered. Specifically, it will be asserted
that although federal legislation has preempted the area of disclosure
procedures, federal financial institutions should be subject to
state-enacted substantive anti-redlining laws.
II. The Relevant Legislation
At the federal level, there exists a complete statutory scheme to
regulate all aspects of real estate finance.' 6 The principal federal
procedural statute designed to expose and prevent redlining practices
is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA).17 However,
Congress has never enacted a legislative prohibition on the practice of
redlining. The preemption conflict between federal statutes and
regulations and similar state legislation is best understood by an
introduction to the federal, state and municipal regulatory schemes.
15. The federal preemption doctrine is discussed fully at notes 124-34 infra and
accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1701-1701z (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Real Estate Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (renumbered by Pub. L. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1159) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976)) (regulating costs and procedures of settlement services
such as title searches, title insurance, appraisals, and other closing requirements);
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (currently codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1461-1470 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. V 1981)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1525, amended by Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat.
255 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976, Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981)). See
generally J. BOYKIN, supra note 2 (discussing legislation pertaining to home financ-
ing).
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976, Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981).
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A. The Federal Regulatory Scheme
Federal regulation of mortgage loans began in 1932 with the
enactment of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA).18 The Act
was passed to alleviate the crisis in the home mortgage market
resulting from the Depression.' The FHLBA created a new
administrative agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), which was authorized to charter twelve Federal Home
Loan Banks to serve as wholesale banks for member financial
institutions. 20 These twelve banks provided a source for mortgage
loans made directly to members of the public.2 '
The FHLBA failed to relieve the crisis and by 1933 approximately
forty percent of all home loans in the United States were in default. 22
Consequently, Congress enacted the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
(HOLA). 23 HOLA's primary purpose2 4 was to counteract the effect of
18. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 725 (1932), amended by 48
Stat. 129, 643, 1261 (1934) (currently codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1455 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
19. This measure was specifically recommended by President Hoover. 75 CONC.
REC. 1263 (1932). Simply stated, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act "aimed to give
relief . . . to the small homeowner of America," id. at 12,574, by reorganizing the
entire banking system. See id. at 12,582.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1423.
21. The Federal Home Loan Banks made loans directly to the public and served as
wholesale banks for member financial institutions. The provision permitting loans to
the public eventually proved ineffective because so few loans were actually made. T.
MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 23-24 (1969).
In 1933, Congress repealed wholesale banks' power to make loans directly to the
public. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (1933). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1424,
1426 & 1430 (current version).
22. T. MARVELL, supra note 21, at 23-24, cited in Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
23. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-
1470 (1976 Supp. V 1981)). To ensure HOLA's enactment, President Roosevelt wrote
to Congress: "I ask the Congress for legislation to protect small homeowners from
foreclosure and relieve them of a portion of the burden of excessive interest and
principal payments incurred during the period of higher values and higher earning
power." H.R. Doc. No. 19, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1618, 1702 (1933), cited in Confer-
ence of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d at 1257.
24. As stated in the Act, its objective was:
To provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness,
to refinance home mortgages, to extend relief to the owners of homes
occupied by them who are unable to amortize their debt elsewhere, to
amend the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, to increase the market for
obligations of the United States, and for other purposes.
48 Stat. 128 (1933). The general counsel for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Horace Russell, a drafter of the bill, indicated the purpose of the Act was not
[Vol. XI
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some state regulations that enabled savings and loan associations to
engage in pernicious practices 25 which exacerbated the defaulting and
foreclosing market.
HOLA performed three functions. First, HOLA repealed that por-
tion of the FHLBA which permitted Federal Home Loan Banks to
make loans directly to members of the public.2 Second, the statute
created the Homeowners' Loan Corporation. 27 Congress empowered
this Corporation to purchase mortgages from financial institutions,
including those with state charters, in exchange for corporate bonds. 28
protection of the investor but protection of the homeowner. Hearings on Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, S. 1317 Before a Subcomm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1933).
By the time HOLA was passed the situation was critical. Loan defaults caused the
failure of 1,700 financial institutions. Consequently, savers accrued losses of approxi-
mately $200 million or about one third the value of total savings held in financial
institutions at the time. T. MARVELL, supra note 21, at 18-19. Thus, HOLA was an
emergency provision.
For judicial discussion of the purpose of HOLA, see United States v. Kay, 89 F.2d
19 (2d Cir. 1937), vacated on other grounds, 303 U.S. 1 (1938); First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Elbert, 33 Ill. App. 3d 335, 337 N.E.2d 420 (1975).
25. For example, state laws permitted sinking fund loans under which principal
payments were placed in compulsory savings accounts. When the balance plus
dividends accrued equalled the amount of the loan, it was deemed paid. The disad-
vantages of this method of repayment were: the maturation period of the loan was
unduly extended if dividend rates declined; in case of reorganization, share values
could be written down; and in the case of liquidation, entire share accounts would be
sacrificed, including those required by borrowers. Despite the liquidation, the bor-
rower still owed the full amount of the mortgage. See STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY IN CALIFORNIA § 111-37 (1960). Another commonly
used, though unfair practice, was to require "balloon payment" loans. Under a
balloon payment loan, large sums of money are due at the final stage of the repay-
ment schedule. Under the economic circumstances of the 1930's very few people were
able to make these large payments. Thus, people who had dutifully repaid their loan
over a long period of time were suddenly placed in default. Id.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. 48 Stat. 129 (1933), repealed by 67 Stat. 126 (1953).
28. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was prohibited from purchasing a
mortgage which contained any of the following provisions: (1) sinking fund clause;
(2) balloon payments clause; or (3) roll over of principal at specified intervals.
Sinking funds and balloon payments are described at note 25 supra. "Rollover" loans
are those in which a loan is extended at an exorbitant rate of interest. These restric-
tions were placed on the Corporations' purchasing power although most mortgage
instruments throughout the country contained such provisions. 77 CONG. REC. 2480,
2573-74 (1933). The desired effect of these restrictions was to induce state chartered
institutions to comply with federal standards and to promote the resale of existing
loans.
Throughout the hearings on HOLA, national uniformity remained a key issue. The
outlawing of certain types of loans constituted a step toward that uniformity. Critics
of the dual banking system point to this type of disparity and advocate a single
federal system. See H. HUTCHESON, supra note 2, at 83-84.
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The Corporation was limited, however, to purchasing only those
mortgages which required direct payments in equal monthly install-
ments. 29 The desired effect of this restriction was to entice state char-
tered institutions to comply with federal standards, thereby facilitat-
ing the resale of loans. The third portion of HOLA established a
system of federally chartered savings and loan associations.30 Addi-
tionally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was authorized to
promulgate regulations for the maintenance and operation of these
federal savings and loans.3 1 In delegating this responsibility, Congress
clearly intended for the FHLBB to be comprised of experts who would
be sensitive to the variety of needs throughout the country. 32 The
Board was to (1) determine the best practices and (2) implement them
on a national level.3 3 This particular statutory authority has become
critical in subsequent preemption decisions, 34 primarily because of its
comprehensive scope.
29. 48 Stat. 128 (1933).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1464.
31. Id. § 1464(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may
invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the
Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe,
to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation,
and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal Savings and Loan
Associations," or "Federal Mutual Savings Banks" . . . and to issue char-
ters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local
mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.
Id.
32. The legislative history evidences this intent. The chairman of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board stated:
A good many people think we ought to put all the state regulations, what
they ought to do and-all that kind of thing, in here. But that is left to
regulation by the Board, who will put the most expert building and loan
authorities on it to provide those regulations so that the regulations can be
varied. In some states you have to deal with them one way and in other
states another way, and we want the latitude allowed to fit the regulations
of the board and the associations to the state law and the different needs.
Hearings on HOLA, H.R. 4980 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933) (statement of William F. Stevenson, chairman, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board). Mr. Stevenson, however, cautioned that the Board should
be very careful to remain within the parameters of existing state laws. Id. By
contrast, one of HOLA's sponsors advocated giving the Bank Board great power to
administer the Act. 77 CONG. REC. 2480 (1933) (statement of Representative Luce).
See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982) for a
thorough discussion of the congressional debates over the Board's authority.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
34. The broad regulatory authority of the FHLBB is frequently characterized as
"covering all aspects of every federal savings and loan association 'from its cradle to
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Using the authority granted to it under HOLA, the FHLBB
promulgated extensive regulations for federal savings and loans.3 5 In
fact, the operation of these institutions is subject exclusively to Board
regulation.36 For example, the Board governs capital fund raising,
earnings distribution, withdrawals and loans. 37 Moreover, an associa-
tion's ability to invest in real estate and to make and purchase real
estate loans is subject to Board proscriptions. 3s Decisions concerning
which types of mortgage instruments are permissible, 39 loans to build-
its corporate grave.' " Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d
1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98
F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
Under the occupation approach to the federal preemption question, see note 128
and text accompanying notes 130-33 infra, courts frequently point to the comprehen-
sive regulatory system promulgated by the FHLBB to determine that federal control
is so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control. See, e.g., Conference
of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem.,
445 U.S. 921 (1980) (procedural aspects of California's Housing Financial Discrimi-
nation Act are preempted since the FHLBB's control over savings and loans is so
pervasive). See also notes 156-58 infra and accompanying text for a complete discus-
sion of the Stein cases. But see note 164 infra and accompanying text.
The judicial approach toward commercial banks, however, has differed from that
taken toward savings and loans. Commercial banks are subject to state laws unless
those regulations hinder national banking or place an undue burden on the bank's
performance. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944).
35. 12 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-541.30, 543.1-543.11, 544.1-544.7, 545.1-545.29, 546.1-
546.5 (1982).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(2) (1976) provides:
To such extent as the Board may authorize by regulation or advice in
writing, any association may borrow, may give security, may be surety as
defined by the Board and may issue such notes, bonds, debentures, or
other obligations, or other securities (except capital stock) as the Board
may so authorize.
Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 506.1-506.6 (1982).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976) provides:
An association may raise capital in the form of such savings deposits,
shares, or other accounts, for fixed, minimum, or indefinite periods of
time (all of which are referred to in this section as savings accounts and all
of which shall have the same priority upon liquidation) as authorized by
its charter or by regulations of the Board, and may issue such passbooks,
time certificates of deposit, or other evidence of savings accounts as are so
authorized.
Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 526.1-526.9 (1982).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1976). The extension of real estate loans for single family
and multi-family mortgage loans is governed by 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V
1981) which provides in pertinent part: "Loans on the security of liens upon residen-
tial real property in an amount which, when added to the amount unpaid upon prior
mortgages, liens, or encumbrances, if any, upon such real estate does not exceed the
appraised value thereof .... ." Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6 to 545.6-11 (1982).
39. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4 (1982), which provides for the use of alternative forms of
mortgage instruments. Section 545.6-4(b) states:
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ers40 and advances41 are also regulated by the Board. The regulations
specifically prohibit both discriminatory loan denials and the arbi-
trary setting of loan terms. 42
In the wake of the increased interest in civil rights in the sixties,
Congress re-examined the home mortgage market. In 1975 Congress
enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 43 empowering
the FHLBB to inspect the books and records of depository institutions
and requiring those institutions to disclose pertinent data. The HMDA
was designed to curtail redlining by financial institutions. 44 Under the
This regulation is promulgated pursuant to the plenary and exclusive
authority of the Board to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal
associations, as set forth in 5(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as
amended. This exercise of the Board's authority is preemptive of any state
law purporting to address the subject of a Federal association's ability or
right to make, purchase, participate or otherwise deal in adjustable mort-
gage loans, or to directly or indirectly restrict such ability or right.
Id.
40. Id. § 545.6-5 (1982).
41. Id. § 531.1. It provides: "Banks may make advances to members, subject to
regulations and restrictions the Board may prescribe .... Advances may be made to
meet withdrawals, cover seasonal requirements, and expand residential mortgage
portfolios." Id.
42. Discrimination is expressly prohibited in the areas of lending, appraisal, un-
derwriting, application procedures and advertising. Id. §§ 528.1-528.8, 531.8. Sec-
tion 528.2 sets forth the prohibitions:
No member institution may deny a loan or other service or discriminate in
fixing the amount, interest rate, duration, application procedures, collec-
tion or enforcement procedures . . .on the basis of the age or location of
the dwelling, or on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex or national
origin of . . . (4) the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants or
occupants of other dwellings in the vicinity of the dwelling(s) for which
such loan . . .is to be made or given.
Section 531.8, a general policy statement, enumerates federal goals to ensure equal
opportunity in home financing. To this end, lending decisions are not to be based on
"unfounded or unsubstantiated assumptions regarding the effect upon loan risk of the
age of the dwelling or the physical or economic characteristics of an area." Id. §
531.8(c)(7). Section 531.8 provides that member institutions should review their
advertising and marketing practices to ensure adequate service to the entire commu-
nity.
43. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976, Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981)).
44. Congress determined that depository institutions contributed to neighborhood
decline by failing to provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants. See
Senate Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 4. The stated purpose of the HMDA was to
supply citizens with the data necessary to determine whether a particular institution
was fulfilling its obligations to the communities in which it was located. 12 U.S.C. §
2801(a), (b) (1976). Congress hoped that fully informed depositors would restrict
their banking business to those institutions demonstrating reinvestment in the com-
munity. See S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975) (disclosure of this data
will "get the facts out" and possibly defuse tensions arising from unsupported allega-
tions of redlining); S. REP. No. 553, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (the Senate version
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Act, lending institutions must compile and make public information
on the number of loans originated and purchased each fiscal year.
45
Geographic breakdowns of this data should indicate whether a partic-
ular neighborhood has been redlined. 4 This method of disclosure has
significant flaws; 47 nevertheless it represents a step toward remedying
the problem.
The most interesting aspect of the HMDA is its broad application.
The act applies to "depository institutions," defined as "any commer-
cial bank, savings bank, savings and loan association, building and
loan association, or homestead association (including cooperative
banks) or credit union which makes federally related mortgage loans
as determined by the Board .... .48 This latter extension brings state
of this bill required the data to be available for inspection at every branch of an
institution); H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975) (disclosure will
identify beginning stages of redlining and provide a vehicle for neighborhood resi-
dents and public officials to join in planning reinvestment strategies); H.R. CONF.
Rm'. No. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) (conference committee report compares
Senate and House purposes in enacting HMDA). See also 121 CONC. REc. 25154,
25157, 25159 & 25171 (1975) (Senate debates).
As originally enacted, the HMDA provided that it would lapse in 1980. Congress,
however, reenacted it in 1980. H.R. REP. Nos. 7509 & 7060, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126
(1980). The HMDA is scheduled to lapse in 1985. 12 U.S.C. § 2811 (Supp. V 1981).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
46. Id. § 2803(a). This information must be maintained and made available for a
period of five years. Id. § 2803(c). Section 2803(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Each depository institution which has a home office or branch office
located within a standard metropolitan statistical area, as defined by the
Office of Management and Budget shall compile and make available, in
accordance with regulations of the Board, to the public for inspection and
copying at the home office, and at at least one branch office within each
standard metropolitan statistical area in which the depository institution
has an office the number and total dollar amount of mortgage loans which
were A) originated, or B) purchased by that institution during each fiscal
year....
Id.
47. Technically, loan statistics need only be made available upon the request of
interested citizens. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(c) (1982). The data is complicated and requires
sophisticated analytical techniques to detect redlining practices. An ordinary citizen
is not capable of the necessary scrutiny. Thus far, only community groups, legislators
and financial analysts have made use of the data. Note, Redlining, Disinvestment
and the Role of Mutual Savings Banks: A Survey of Solutions, 9 FORDHAM URm. L.J.
89, 94 n.18 (1980).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 2802 (1976). While the Board is responsible for promulgating
regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act, id. § 2804(a), enforcement
is delegated to several different agencies. Id. § 2804(b). Thus, the Comptroller of the
Currency is to ensure compliance by national banks; the Federal Reserve Board
ensures compliance of its member banks; the Board of Directors of the FDIC enforces
compliance of its members; and the National Credit Union Administrator is responsi-
ble for compliance by credit unions. Id.
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chartered institutions within its parameters. In fact, the Act contains
a provision for determining whether state chartered institutions
should comply with state or federal regulations. 4 Section 2805(a) of
the HMDA provides that state laws are not annulled and state institu-
tions may continue to comply with state procedural regulations so
long as the Board does not determine that those requirements are
inconsistent with the federal law.50 While the standards for determin-
ing inconsistency are not set forth, it is clear that if the state law
requires more extensive disclosure, there cannot be a judgment of
inconsistency. 51 Specific state institutions may be exempted by the
Board from the Act's informational requirements and a number of
states have applied for and received this exemption status. 52 No provi-
sion, however, addresses the relationship between federally chartered
institutions and state enacted disclosure regulations.5 3 One facet of the
preemption debate has centered around this gap in the law.
49. Id. § 2805.
50. Id. The section provides:
This chapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any State char-
tered depository institution subject to the provisions of this chapter from
complying with the laws of any State or subdivision thereof with respect to
public disclosure and record keeping by depositor institutions, except to
the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this
chapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. The Board is
authorized to determine whether such inconsistencies exist. The Board
may not determine that any such law is inconsistent with any provision of
this chapter if the Board determines that such law requires the mainte-
nance of records with greater geographic or other detail than is required
under this chapter, or that such law otherwise provides greater disclosure
than is required under this chapter.
Id.
51. Id.
52. California, Illinois, Massachusetts and New York applied for and were
granted exemptions by the FHLBB. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,581-83 (1976). The Board also
exempted New Jersey institutions. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 984
(3d Cir. 1980).
.53. The Senate originally recommended that the predecessor provision to § 2805-
the section entitled "relation to state laws"--include the following language:
(a) This Act does not annul, alter or affect, or exempt any person subject
to the provisions of this Act from complying with the laws of any state or
subdivision thereof with respect to public disclosure and recordkeeping by
depositor institutions. ...
(b) The Board may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this
Act any depository institution within any state or subdivision thereof if it
determines that under the laws of such state or subdivision, that institution
is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this
Act.
121 CONG. REC. 27,624 (1975) (emphasis added).
The House members of the joint conference committee, however, feared that
permitting state law to govern federally chartered institutions threatened the dual
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In 1977, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) . 4 Congress intended the CRA to encourage "institutions to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institu-
tions."'55 Under the Act, financial institutions56 have an affirmative
obligation to meet the community's needs and are required to estab-
lish their compliance.5 7 Despite the general reference to community
financial needs, neither redlining nor loan refusal based on property
location is expressly prohibited.5 8 Instead, the CRA is written in posi-
tive terms to encourage reinvestment
s
.
5
banking system. Consequently, the bill was amended to its current form which
restricts the availability of exemption to state chartered institutions. S. REP. No. 553,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1975). See notes 143 & 165 infra and accompanying text.
54. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. V 1981)). The CRA is evaluated in Note,
The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlin-
ing, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 635 (1979).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
56. The CRA applies to national banks and savings and loans, as well as to state
banks and savings and loans who belong to the Federal Reserve System, or are
insured by the FDIC or FSLIC. Id. § 2902.
57. Id. § 2901(a) provides:
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the com-
munities in which they are chartered to do business;
(2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for credit
services as well as deposit services; and
(3) regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obli-
gations to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered.
Id. Pursuant to this section a Credit Reinvestment Statement must be written and
made public by FDIC members, 12 C.F.R. § 345.4 (1982), by FSLIC insured
members, id. § 563e.4, and Federal Reserve members, id. § 228.4. The CRA State-
ment delineates the local community and specifies the forms of credit which the
lender offers to the community.
58. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. V 1981).
59. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the CRA to herald the
beginning of a national community reinvestment policy. See 123 CONG. REC. 31886-
93 (1977).
Financial institutions have objected to this philosophy of reinvestment in their
local communities on the ground that their portfolios become too weighted with local
investments. Givens, The "Anti-redlining" Issue: Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95
BANKING L.J. 515, 520-25 (1978). Moreover, there are potential constitutional impli-
cations in that investors' rights may be affected by requiring banks to act in a manner
which is not necessarily prudent. A second constitutional question is whether the free
flow of commerce is interrupted by the reinvestment requirement. See, e.g., Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey statute prohibiting the
importation of solid wastes collected from outside the state was held to violate the
Commerce Clause); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (Mary-
land statute designed to induce suppliers to process scrapped vehicles within the state
was held not to burden interstate commerce).
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The CRA comes into play, when a financial institution seeks a
federal charter, deposit insurance, merger, consolidation, or new
branch.6 0 The appropriate federal supervisory agency responsible for
approving the application is directed to assess the institution's record
of meeting the community's needs and to take this data into account in
its evaluation of the application.' Moreover, each of the relevant
supervisory agencies is directed to establish regulations necessary to
implement the goals of the CRA.6 2
The Economic Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)6 3 prohibits credit
discrimination and is significant in two respects. First, it is one of two
affirmative measures to be drawn upon in the battle against redlin-
ing.64 Second, it is expressly not preemptive of concurrent state law.
65
Thus federally chartered institutions are subject to state statutes gov-
erning discriminatory credit practices.6 6
These three Acts comprising the federal legislative scheme devel-
oped to stem credit discrimination do not expressly prohibit redlining.
However, pursuant to the general policies of providing fair credit and
housing opportunities embodied in these statutes, the FHLBB has
issued regulations prohibiting lending discrimination. 7 Specifically,
no member association may discriminate on the basis of the dwelling's
60. Under § 2903 the appropriate supervisory agency is directed to consider an
institution's record of meeting community credit needs in evaluating an application
for a deposit facility. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. V 1981). "[Alpplication for a deposit
facility" is defined to include an application for a charter, deposit insurance, a new
branch, merger, or consolidation. Id. § 2902(3).
61. Id. § 2903 (Supp. V 1981). See 12 C.F.R. § 228.8 (1982) (Federal Reserve
Board regulations promulgated under the CRA).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 2905 (Supp. V 1981). See 12 C.F.R. § 228 (Federal Reserve
Board); § 543; § 545; § 546; § 563; § 584 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
64. See note 58 supra. See also Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Hearings on S. 1927
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess. 318, 467, 479 (1975) (testimony of experts suggesting that the ECOA will aid in
the elimination of redlining).
65. The ECOA provides:
This subchapter does not annul, alter or affect, or exempt any person
subject to the provisions of this subchapter, from complying with, the laws
of any State with respect to credit discrimination, except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then
only to the extent of the inconsistency.
15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (1976) (emphasis added).
66. The Congressional Committee stated its intent to ensure that those state laws
which grant greater protection to the credit applicant shall apply equally to all credit
granting institutions located in that state. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 403,
4.14. See 90 Stat. 251, 253 (1976).
67. 12 C.F.R. §§ 528.2, 531.8 (1982).
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age or location, or on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin of the owners or occupants of dwellings in the vicinity. 8 An-
other aspect of the preemption issue relates to these substantive regu-
lations.
B. State Legislation
State action against redlining commenced prior to the enactment of
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and served as a motivating factor
in the passage of the HMDA. 9 Congress desired uniformity; neverthe-
less, "substantially similar" state laws qualify a state for exemption
from the federal disclosure requirements. 70 Consequently, uniformity
does not exist. Those states which have legislated in this field have
devised significant variations. 71 An examination of selected state stat-
utes illustrates the diverse anti-redlining approaches currently in ef-
fect.
California has developed an extensive statutory and regulatory
scheme dealing with discriminatory mortgage lending practices. The
68. Id. § 528.2(a). See note 42 supra.
69. The House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing reported that
Massachusetts and Illinois were already collecting data on lending practices. H.R.
REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975). The report further noted that Chicago
and other cities also were contemplating disclosure requirements and concluded:
Your committee believes that the trend at state and local levels to require
mortgage disclosure makes it imperative that Congress act. If the Congress
does not set at least a Federal minimum disclosure requirement by law,
state regulated institutions required to submit mortgage disclosure infor-
mation could well be placed in a competitively disadvantaged position
with respect to Federally regulated institutions. Your committee believes
that mortgage disclosure by only state institutions would not meet the
public's needs nor foster the development of the dual banking system ...
"Unless there is uniformity, we will find one group [state chartered institu-
tions] seeking refuge in another set of laws," noted one witness.
Id. at 19.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 2805 (1976).
71. For instance, while no federal statute creates an affirmative duty to refrain
from redlining, some states have expressly prohibited mortgage discrimination based
on geographic location. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35810 (West Supp.
1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F (West Supp. 1982-1983); New York Supervisory
Procedure G-107, promulgated pursuant to N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 10, 36(1), 36(3),
125(2) (McKinney 1971) [hereinafter cited as Supervisory Procedure G-107].
Moreover, while the HMDA and the regulations promulgated under it lack sanc-
tions, some states have devised enforcement methods as well as penalties. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35815 (West Supp. 1982) (state treasurer may decline to
deposit state funds in an institution found to be discriminating in lending); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 17, § 855 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (civil action for damages); N.J. STAT ANN. §
17:16F-7 (civil damages), § 17:16F-9 (cease and desist order); § 17:16F-10 (penalty
for violation of cease and desist order).
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central attack on redlining is the Holden Act 72 which concerns finan-
cial discrimination. The statute specifically states that this measure
was enacted to discontinue the practice of denying mortgage loans
because of "conditions, characteristics, or trends in a neighbor-
hood."' 73 Therefore, the Holden Act prohibits redlining on two levels.
First, financial assistance cannot be withheld because of economic
trends in the neighborhood surrounding the housing accommoda-
tion. 74 Second, the racial, ethnic, religious, or national origin compo-
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35834 (West Supp. 1982) (also referred
to as the Housing and Financial Discrimination Act).
73. Id. § 35801. The legislature enumerated its findings and declarations:
(a) The subject of housing is of vital statewide importance to the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents of the state. . . .(e) With respect to
certain geographic areas, financial institutions have sometimes denied
financial assistance or approved assistance on terms less favorable than are
usually offered in other geographic areas, regardless of the creditworthi-
ness of the applicant or the condition of the real-property security offered,
and this practice has the following effects:
(1) Contributes to the decline of available housing in such areas and is
likely to continue to do so.
(2) Limits the choice of housing opportunities and inhibits the opera-
tion of a healthy housing market in such areas.
(3) Leads to the abandonment of such areas.
(4) Adversely affects the health, welfare and safety of the residents of
this state.
(5) Undermines the value of the equity of current owners of property in
such areas.
(6) Inhibits the granting of amortized loans.
(7) Perpetuates racially and economically segregated neighborhoods
and geographic areas.
(8) The practice of denying mortgage loans or adversely varying the
terms of such loans because of conditions, characteristics or trends in a
neighborhood or geographic area that are unrelated to the creditworthi-
ness of the applicant or the value of the real property security offered is
against public policy.
Id. The stated purposes of the Act include preventing discrimination, encouraging
increased lending in areas where financial assistance was previously unavailable, and
preventing abandonment and decay of neighborhoods. Id. § 35802.
74. Section 35810 provides:
No financial institution shall discriminate in the availability of, or in the
provision of, financial assistance for the purpose of purchasing, construct-
ing, rehabilitating, improving, or refinancing housing accommodations
due, in whole or in part, to the consideration of conditions, characteris-
tics, or trends in the neighborhood or geographic area surrounding the
housing accommodation, unless the financial institutions can demonstrate
that such consideration in the particular case is required to avoid unsafe
and unsound business practice.
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sition of a community surrounding the housing accommodation shall
not be considered in determining whether to grant a requested loan. 75
The Secretary of Business and Transportation is charged with the
enforcement of the Holden Act. 76 Furthermore, the Secretary is em-
powered to issue regulations necessary to implement the Act. 77 Part of
the Secretary's duties include complaint resolution.78 The complaint
resolution provisions of the Act allow an injured party to collect up to
$1000 in damages.7 9 The California statute also sets forth a notice
provision requiring financial institutions to inform all loan applicants
of their right to review after denial of the mortgage loan. 0
The New York State Banking Department has issued a regulation
requiring banks to maintain a record of all loan applications. 81 The
75. Section 35812 provides:
No financial institution shall consider the racial, ethnic, religious, or
national origin composition of a neighborhood or geographic area sur-
rounding a housing accommodation or whether or not such composition is
undergoing change, or is expected to undergo change, in appraising a
housing accommodation or in determining whether or not, and under
what terms and conditions, to provide financial assistance for the purpose
of purchasing, constructing, rehabilitating, improving or refinancing a
housing accommodation. No financial institution shall utilize appraisal
practices that are inconsistent with the provisions of this part.
Id. Additionally, § 35811 prohibits discrimination in the availability of financial
assistance for housing due to considerations of race, sex, religion, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry. Id. § 35811.
76. Id. § 35815. The secretary is instructed to monitor and investigate lending
practices.
77. Id. § 35814.
78. An aggrieved applicant may file a complaint with the secretary. Id. § 35820.
The secretary is authorized to hold an arbitration conference. Id. § 35821.
79. Upon a finding by the secretary that an unlawful practice has occurred, the
institution is to be served with written findings and a cease and desist order which
also directs the institution to grant the loan or pay damages to the complainant. Id. §
35822.
80. Id. § 35830. The provision also requires information concerning the complaint
procedures to be posted in a conspicuous location in the financial institution. Addi-
tional protection is afforded by the California Real Estate Department regulations
which require that the developers of subdivisions identify to prospective buyers
lenders who will be associated with the development. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
11018.2 (West 1964 & Supp. 1982). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 2792.6
(1982) (microfiche) (Regulations of the Real Estate Commission which provide that
the commissioner shall examine any subdivision and shall issue to the subdivider a
public report authorizing the sale or lease of the lots or parcels within the subdivi-
sion).
81. Supervisory Procedure G-107 was promulgated pursuant to N.Y. BANKINC
LAW §§ 10, 36(1), 36(3), 125(2) (McKinney 1971). For a thorough analysis of Super-
visory Procedure G-107 see Note, supra note 47.
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regulation, commonly called Supervisory Procedure G-107, requires
banks to record the basis for denying or granting a loan application as
well as the terms of approved loans . 2 The Banking Department ana-
lyzes the information to "insure that discrimination in housing mort-
gage credit does not occur."'8 3 The information actually available to
the public, however, consists only of the number and dollar amounts
of mortgage loans grouped by zip code or census tract.84 In addition to
these disclosure requirements, chapter 788 of the New York Banking
Law expressly prohibits discrimination in mortgage lending where the
decision is based upon geographic location.8 5 Consequently, when an
application is denied, the aggrieved applicant may request a review of
the denial by the Superintendent of Banks. 86 The Superintendent,
upon finding a violation, may compel the bank to discontinue the
discriminatory practice. 87 Furthermore, as provided in the compara-
ble Federal Credit Reinvestment Act regulations, the state may con-
sider a bank's lending patterns while evaluating a bank's application
to establish a new branch. 88 This measure can have a strong deterrent
effect, particurlarly on younger, smaller institutions which project
significant growth and expansion. The potential deterrent power of
this provision is limited, however, because it is indirect and is used
only after the practices have occurred for an extended period of time.
New Jersey promulgated its anti-redlining statutes in 1977 to "pro-
hibit the arbitrary denials of mortgage loans on the basis of the
82. Supervisory Procedure G-107, §107.7 app. 7, Part III, at 8. The bank must
answer questions about the applicant's creditworthiness on an "equal housing oppor-
tunity lender form" as well as indicate his race and marital status. Id., app. 7, Part I,
at 5-6.
83. Id., app. 7, at 5; §§ 107.6 to 107.8.
84. Id., § 107.2(b)(1), (2). Additionally, information pertaining to foreclosure,
delinquent payments, renegotiated loans, and specific mortgage terms are made
public. See app. 8.
85. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). A banking institution
is prohibited from discriminating or refusing to make a "prudent" mortgage loan on
the basis of the geographic location if the property is "located within the geographic
area ordinarily serviced by such bank or within the community" where the bank or
its branch is located. Id. § 9-f(1).
86. Id. § 9-f(2).
87. Id. § 39 (McKinney 1971). The Superintendent may also impose penalties. Id.
§ 44 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
88. General regulations of the Banking Board §§ 76.1-76.3, promulgated pursu-
ant to N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 10, 14(1), 28(b), 29, 601-b (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1982-1983). An additional and essential element in the State's legislative scheme is
the New York Human Rights Law which prohibits discrimination in the general area
of credit allocation. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a (McKinney 1971).
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location of the property to be mortgaged."89 In furtherance of this
ultimate goal, the statute expressly prohibits discrimination in grant-
ing and denying loans because the property is located in a "specific
neighborhood or geographic area." 0 Additionally, no depository in-
stitution may impose discriminatory conditions upon the loan applica-
tion or procedures surrounding it."' The statute extends broadly to all
banks, savings and loans, and credit unions with total assets exceeding
$10 million.9 2 To monitor the conduct of New Jersey depository insti-
tutions, extensive disclosure is required on a quarterly basis. This
information must be available for a period of five years.9 3
Enforcement of these two prongs-the substantive prohibitions and
the disclosure requirements-is delegated to the New Jersey Commis-
sioner of Banking. The Commissioner is empowered to conduct inves-
tigations, hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and compel witnesses to
attend. 4 Upon a finding that a financial institution is discriminating
in its lending policies or practices, the Commissioner is authorized to
issue a cease and desist order9 5
Other states, including Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michi-
gan, have legislated against redlining. Massachusetts requires certain
banks and credit unions to report and make public residential loan
data. " Violators may be subject to fines and sanctions. 7 Wisconsin
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F-1 to :16F-11 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The legisla-
tion was intended to increase the available mortgage capital in capital deficient
communities and to provide information to state residents as to which institutions are
meeting their obligations to the neighborhood. Id. § 17:16F-1.
90. Id. § 17:16F-3.
91. Id. § 17:16F-3(b). The New Jersey legislature amended this anti-redlining
statute in 1979 to prevent banks from circumventing the law by discouraging or
refusing to accept loan applications. See Assembly Banking and Insurance Comm.
Statement, 1979 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. c. 148, Assembly No. 3019 (West).
92. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F-2(a) (West Supp. 1982-1983). The legislature in-
tended to enforce the statute against both state and federally chartered institutions.
See note 172 infra.
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F-6 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The information to be
reported is the number and dollar amounts of loans originated and purchased. Id. §
17:16F-4.
94. id. § 17:16F-8.
95. Id. § 17:16F-9.
96. Mass. Comm'r of Banks, Disclosure Directive (Ref. No. 18-2c). The Massachu-
setts Commissioner of Banking issued a directive requiring mortgage and deposit data
from institutions. Additionally, he established a procedure for depositors to petition
to have an opportunity to examine the information. The data must be included in the
Annual Report of Examination for specified state chartered banks and credit unions.
Id. For an analysis of the compiled data see Taggart & Smith, Redlining: An
Assessment of the Evidence of Disinvestment in Metropolitan Boston, 17 URB. AFF.
Q. 91 (1981).
97. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167, § 7 (West Supp. 1982).
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expressly prohibits redlining by savings and loan associations9 8 but
does not require disclosure. The Ohio disclosure statute requires quar-
terly reports to include the addresses on which mortgage loans have
been granted. 99 Michigan mandates disclosure, prohibits redlining
and also provides means of enforcement. 00 To ensure compliance
with the various provisions of the Michigan anti-redlining statutory
scheme, a series of depository laws prohibit any state agency from
depositing public funds in any federal or state depository institution
which fails to report the required loan data.' 0 ' This carrot and stick
approach employs public funds to induce compliance on a broad
scale. 102
98. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. S-L, §§ 27.0 to .11 (1975).
99. H.B. 485, amending 13 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01, enacting § 1343.01
(Page Supp. 1976).
100. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1601 to .1609 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
Penalties may be imposed for violations. Id. § 445.1612. Additionally, communities
are encouraged to form local review boards to deal with complaints. Id. § 445.1609.
Where local voluntary boards are found to be ineffective, the banking commissioner
is permitted to form mandatory boards. Id.
One comprehensive legislative scheme to combat redlining, the Illinois Financial
Institutions Disclosure Act, has been invalidated. The Illinois Act required disclosure
of the number and dollar amounts of loan applications and of loans granted. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 201 (Smith-Hurd 1977), invalidated in Glen Ellyn Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 111. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927
(1979). In Glen Ellyn the Illinois Supreme Court held that the HMDA preempted the
Illinois Statute. The Financial Institutions Disclosure Act contained a nonseverability
clause and therefore the entire statute was deemed ineffective. Id. at 500, 377 N.E.2d
at 4.
101. Specific governmental agencies are directed not to deposit their funds in any
financial institution which does not file, either voluntarily or pursuant to state law,
disclosure reports required by § 445.1606 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. See 1979
Mich. Pub. Acts 77 (unincorporated villages); id. 78 (community college districts);
id. 79 (counties, cities, villages, townships, agencies, boards and commissions); id. 84
(county board of commissioners); id. 86 (surplus county funds); id. 87 (school dis-
tricts); id. 88 (surplus state funds).
102. Recently several federal savings and loan associations in Michigan brought
suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that they were exempt from the
Michigan anti-redlining statutes. Michigan Savings & Loan League v. Francis, 683
F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982). The case was dismissed for lack of federal question
jurisdiction, since preemption was raised only as a defense to threatened state action.
The Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau determined not to take action to compel
compliance with the state anti-redlining laws because the rate of voluntary compli-
ance was very high. Telephone interview with Mr. Daniel Tsai, Director of Urban
Investment Unit of the Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau (Feb. 4, 1983). Ac-
cording to Mr. Tsai, federally chartered financial institutions are under a duty to
comply with the substantive anti-redlining provisions of the Michigan law; however,
enforcement authority remains with the appropriate federal agency.
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C. Municipal Ordinances
Significantly, the local municipal governments of several older ur-
ban areas have promulgated ordinances to discourage redlining. 10 3
Chicago, under the leadership of Mayor Daley, passed its Municipal
Depositories Ordinance in 1974.104 Under the Municipal Depositories
Ordinance, before a depository institution may be eligible to hold city
funds, two conditions must be met. 10 5 The first requirement is to
report information pertaining to residential lending practices. 106 This
disclosure is substantially more extensive than that required under the
federal HMDA. 10 7 The second condition imposed is that the institution
must sign a pledge that it will not arbitrarily reject mortgage loans for
a particular geographic area on the basis of location or age of the
property. 0 8 Thus city funds give the Chicago city government lever-
age to induce compliance with anti-redlining laws.
Similarly, Cleveland's Municipal Ordinance regulates financial in-
stitutions seeking to be public fund depositories.109 Modeled after the
Chicago law, Cleveland's version also requires comprehensive disclo-
sure. 110 This includes the duty to report data concerning the number
and dollar amounts of deposits held in the bank."' Additionally,
Cleveland requires lending institutions to sign a pledge to refrain from
redlining practices. "12
103. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE §§ 7-32 to 7-41 (1974); CLEVELAND, OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 127.34 (1976); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 139.406 (1974).
104. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE §§ 7-32 to 7-41 (1974).
105. The City Comptroller is directed to obtain residential lending information
with each bid for interest on City and School funds. Id. § 7-34. It has been argued
that the burden of disclosure could influence a bank to forego holding city funds.
Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment): The Parameters of Federal, State,
and Municipal Regulation, 54 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 367, 394 (1977).
106. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-34.
107. In addition to specific lending related data, information concerning deposits
held is required. See note 113 infra and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. CLEVELAND, OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 127.34 (1976).
110. Depository institutions must disclose information on construction and home
improvement loans as well as the number and dollar amounts on savings accounts.
Id.
111. Id. § 127.34(b).
112. Id. § 127.35. The pledge provides:
We pledge not to arbitrarily reject mortgage loans for residential proper-
ties within a specific geographic area in Cleveland because of the location
and/or age of the property, or in the case of a proposed borrower to
arbitrarily vary the terms of those loans or the application procedures for
those loans because of race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex or
marital status. In addition, we pledge to make loans available on low and
moderate income residential property in the neighborhoods of the City of
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The requirement to disclose the number of and dollar amounts of
deposits held by the institution was expressly rejected by Congress." 3
Moreover the federal government has no such leverage as the with-
holding of funds for failure to comply with anti-redlining measures.
Thus these city regulations considerably exceed the scope of the fed-
eral legislative scheme.
Another comprehensive and well organized municipal attack on
redlining is the Minneapolis Ordinance" 4 passed in 1974. It is actually
a civil rights ordinance and is composed of three integral parts. The
first aspect addresses discrimination against individual loan applicants
who belong to enumerated protected classes."15 The second facet regu-
lates the types of permissible questions used on mortgage application
forms."16 The third portion prohibits redlining." 7 According to the
ordinance, redlining is discrimination against a loan applicant who
desires funds for use "in specific urban area because of social, eco-
nomic or environmental conditions of the area .... I'll Financial
institutions are mandated to post a sign, in a conspicuous location,
which advises loan applicants of their rights and directs them to
telephone either a state or city civil rights agency to register their
complaint. 1 9 Statutory relief available includes an order compelling
the institution to make the loan,120 punitive damages,' 2 ' and in certain
circumstances, a monetary award for pain and suffering.122 The City
Cleveland within the limits of our legal restrictions and prudent financial
practices.
id.
113. The drafters of HMDA rejected-this broad form of disclosure because it
represented an attempt to allocate credit and violated depositor privacy. S. REP. No.
187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1975).
114. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, §§ 139.40(G), 141.50
(1974).
115. Id. § 139.40(G)(1).
116. Id. § 139.40(G)(2).
117. Id. § 139.40(C)(3).
118. Id.
119. Id. The sign must state:
This institution abides by the state and local law prohibiting the denial of
a mortgage or home improvement loan or the granting of a mortgage or
home improvement loan on different terms, because of the conditions in
the neighborhood in which the home is located. If you believe that you
have been discriminated against, call either of the following agencies for
help: State Human Rights Department; City Civil Rights Department.
120. Id. § 139.50(d).
121. Id.
122. Telephone interview with Will Ternoir, Minneapolis City Civil Rights De-
partment (December 1982). Mr. Ternoir stated that no complaints had yet been
registered.
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Civil Rights Department is prohibited from acting on its own: it must
act only in response to a complaint. Thus enforcement is subject to
limitations. 123
This survey reveals the variety of methods currently in use to com-
bat redlining. While each method may have drawbacks or flaws, it is
impossible to determine which approach will be most effective if
lenders are unsure of which measure requires their compliance. Busi-
nesses, homeowners and property buyers suffer from Congress' failure
to address the issue of state legislation and federal institutions. Finan-
cial institutions may incur additional costs through compliance with
both federal and state regulations or may risk penalties for noncompli-
ance on the presumption of preemption. The only way to alleviate
these problems is to resolve the following issues: (1) has the federal law
preempted local statutes; (2) if so, is preemption limited to procedural
anti-redlining laws; and (3) can the law relating to preemption in the
area of banking be applied to savings and loans. These questions will
be addressed after an overview of the preemption doctrine.
III. Preemption Doctrine
The federal preemption doctrine developed from the Supremacy
Clause 124 of the United States Constitution. Traditionally, preemption
describes the invalidation of a state statute where the federal laws in,
the same area preclude concurrent regulation.125 The simplest exam-
123. See note 122 supra. For a detailed discussion of the various state and munici-
pal anti-redlining laws see Ryan, supra note 6, at 77; Werner, Frej & Madway, supra
note 6, at 517; Wisniewski, supra note 105, at 394.
124. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States, which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2.
125. According to the United States Supreme Court, the states retain all prior
rights of sovereignty except those exclusively delegated to Congress. Exclusive federal
authority exists when (1) the Constitution expressly grants authority to Congress and
prohibits that authority to states, (2) exclusive authority is granted to Congress or (3)
authority is granted to Congress to which a similar state authority would be contra-
dictory or repugnant. In summary, the Court noted that care must be exercised in
distinguishing between those situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power
by the federal government and the states or by the states alone may lead possibly to
conflicts, and those situations where conflicts will necessarily arise. "It is not ... a
mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of power, but an immediate consti-
tutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing
right of [state] sovereignty." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 243 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
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ple is where, by constitutional mandate, Congress is given exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate a particular field. In the absence of a delega-
tion of exclusive authority to Congress, the key factor is congressional
intent. 12 Ordinarily federal law does not preempt a field within the
state's police power, absent a clear and manifest purpose to do so. 127
In examining concurrent federal and state legislation, the United
States Supreme Court has adopted two approaches: the "occupation"
theory,1 28 and the "conflict" theory.1 29 Under the occupation ap-
126. Preemption " 'is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.' "
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See, e.g., New York State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (Supreme Court refused to void
state statutes absent congressional intent to preempt them); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (it is necessary to examine the federal act to determine what
objectives Congress intended); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 146 (1963) (Court considered whether Congress ordained that the state
regulation yield to federal law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (to
ascertain the boundaries of federal legislation, the Court looks to the federal statute
itself, read in light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history).
127. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Justice Douglas,
writing for a majority of the Court, asserted: "we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. at 230.
128. "Occupation" is synonomous with "ouster" or "displacement" and it occurs in
one of three ways. The Court's three step analysis revolves around these methods of
occupation. Therefore, the Court must first ascertain whether the federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive as to naturally give rise to the inference that Congress left no
room for supplementary state laws. Compare City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (pervasive nature of the federal scheme of
aircraft supervision led the court to find preemption) with Head v. New Mexico Bd.
of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 431 (1963) (federal regulation of interstate
commerce was not so pervasive as to preclude state legislative measures to control
radio advertising practices).
If the scheme is deemed to be less than pervasive, the court must then determine
whether federal interest in the field is so dominant that state legislation would be
excluded. Compare Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1940) (the national
interest in foreign affairs including supervision of immigration, naturalization and
deportation is dominant to any individual state's interest) with Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144-45 (1963) (state's interest in the
marketing of foodstuffs dominates any national interest in uniformity in the field).
Finally, the court must determine whether the declared objective of a federal act
and the obligations imposed by the act demonstrate congressional intent to occupy
the field. For a complete discussion of "occupation" see Note, The Preemption
Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 623 (1975).
129. State legislation is nullified when it conflicts with federal law. Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3022. Conflict occurs where
compliance with both federal and state laws is physically impossible. Florida Lime &
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proach, state legislation is invalidated where it is determined that
Congress intended to occupy the field fully. 130 The clear and manifest
purpose of Congress to occupy the field is found either by express
declarations or in the legislative history.' 31 In the application of the
"occupation" test, courts have not interpreted "occupy" liberally.132
However, once occupation is found, the state statute is invalid regard-
less of the aid or enhancement it provides to the federal regulatory
scheme.13 3
In the same vein, the conflict approach is utilized where Congress
has not manifested an intent to exclusively regulate a particular field.
Under these circumstances, state laws which conflict with or frustrate
the goals of federal laws are invalid.134 The classic test under the
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). Additionally, conflict
arises where the state statute hinders the accomplishment of Congress' goals in
enacting the federal law. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See notes 135-
36 infra and accompanying text for a complete discussion of Hines. Under this
analysis the court must examine both the federal and state laws.
130. E.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971) (Federal Bankruptcy Act
precludes state supervision of this area); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 236 (1946) (by amendments to the Federal Warehouse Act, Congress eliminated
dual regulation and demonstrated that it foreclosed State regulation of warehouse-
men).
131. See notes 126-27 supra.
132. There is no existing presumption of federal supremacy. See Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230. Indeed, one Justice has observed:
At a time when the exercise of the federal power is being rapidly expanded
through Congressional action, it is difficult to overstate the importance of
safeguarding against such diminution of state power by vague inferences
as to what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter or
by reference to our own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not
expressed and which is not plainly to be inferred from the legislation
which it has enacted.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 75 (Stone, J. dissenting). Critics, however, have
commented that:
By framing the preemption question in terms of specific Congressional
intent the Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for itself. Apart
from the difficult problem of defining which Congress' and which con-
gressman's intent is relevant, this manner of stating the issue suggests that
the preemption question was consciously resolved and that only diligent
effort is needed to reveal the intended solution.
Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 208, 209 (1959).
133. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). The Court stated: "The relative
importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a
valid federal law .. " Id.
134. The Supreme Court cautioned: "we must also be careful to distinguish those
situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government
and the States . . . may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where conflicts
will necessarily arise." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at 554. Therefore, the Court
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conflict approach was formulated by the Supreme Court in Hines v.
Davidowitz.' 35 In Hines the Court defined its function as one of
determining "whether ... [the state] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."1 3 Several factors must be considered, including the sub-
ject of the regulation, the agency seeking to regulate, statutory lan-
guage and legislative intent.137 Frequently, the basic tenets of federal-
ism influence the decision in a preemption case.' 38
IV. Preemption and Redlining
Most often the central question in a preemption case is whether the
state law is constitutional. 139 In banking laws and redlining legisla-
tion, however, the crucial issue is whether the state law may be
applied to a federal institution. The HMDA is silent on this issue. In a
series of federal and state cases challenging the application of state
mortgage disclosure requirements to federally chartered institutions,
however, it has been established clearly that courts have interpreted
the HMDA procedural provisions to have preempted the field.1 40
In Glen Ellyn Savings & Loan Association v. Tsoumas,' 41 a feder-
ally chartered savings and loan sought a declaration that the Illinois
Financial Institutions Disclosure Act was inapplicable to national
institutions.1 42 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the federally
chartered associations were exempt from state disclosure proce-
explained that state law is preempted where it is "absolutely and totally contradic-
tory and repugnant" to federal law. Id. at 553 (quoting THE FEDFRALIST No. 32, at
241 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)). See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151 (1978) (Washington state law requiring certain oil tankers to use
licensed pilots while in Puget Sound held to conflict with Federal Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act of 1972).
135. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
136. Id. at 67.
137. Marino v. Town of Ramapo, 68 Misc. 2d 44, 59, 326 N.Y.S.2d 162, 180 (Sup.
Ct. Rockland County 1971) (citing Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400, 406 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1968)).
138. See Note, supra note 128, at 623.
139. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
140. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980); Conference of
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445
U.S. 921 (1980); Glen Ellyn Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 Ill. 2d 493, 377
N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1979). See generally Payne, Banking
Institutions Trim State Efforts to Enforce Anti-Redlining Measures, 9 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 357 (1981) (discusses recent cases).
141. 71 Ill. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1979).
142. Id. at 500, 377 N.E.2d at 4.
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dures.143 The basis for the Glen Ellyn decision was that Congress, by
enacting the HMDA, fully occupied the field and state regulation
would infringe upon federal interests. 144 In finding occupation the
court relied upon the language in the HMDA pertaining to the exemp-
tion for state financial institutions subject to equally stringent state
disclosure laws. 45 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Con-
gress intended exclusive regulation of federally chartered savings and
loans; only state associations could be exempted.1 46 The court con-
ceded, however, that this interpretation represented a retreat from
the stated purpose of the HMDA.147 Nevertheless, HMDA's legislative
history mandated this result.
In the original draft form, both the House and Senate bills provided
that federal institutions were to be subject to both state and federal
anti-redlining legislation. 148 Furthermore, these drafts permitted ei-
ther state or federal associations to be exempt from the federal statute
if similar state provisions existed. Predicated upon congressional com-
mittee recommendations, these provisions evidenced recognition of
the local nature of the redlining problem and the ability of each state
to devise laws best equipped to deal with the particular problems of a
specific locale. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs reported that the federal disclosure requirements should
apply to all institutions with the caveat that a state law with substan-
tially similar mandates would take precedence. 149 The House Banking
143. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating: "[u]n-
der the supremacy clause of article VI, United States Constitution, the Federal Act
has preempted the application of the State Act to federally chartered institutions
subject to the Federal Act." Id. See Janda, Federal Preemption of the Illinois Finan-
cial Institutions Disclosure Act-Glen Ellyn Savings and Loan Association v.
Tsoumas, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 805 (1979).
144. Glen Ellyn, 71111. 2d at 499, 377 N.E.2d at 3. Specifically, the court referred
to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's protestations that to subject "[f]ederally
chartered institutions to state disclosure laws would threaten the dual banking sys-
tem." Id.
145. Id. at 498, 377 N.E.2d at 3. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
146. Glen Ellyn, 71111. 2d at 498, 377 N.E.2d at 3. This conclusion was supported
by the legislative history of the HMDA. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
147. Glen Ellyn, 71111. 2d at 499, 377 N.E.2d at 3. The court noted that compel-
ling federally chartered institutions to comply with the more extensive disclosure
requirements of the Illinois Act would augment the information available to citizens
and public officials. This in turn would enhance the potential for determining
whether depository institutions were fulfilling their obligations to the community.
148. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975); S. REP. No. 553, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1975); see note 53 supra and accompanying text.
149. See H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1975); S. REP. No. 187,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
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committee also recommended the same approach in a report which
emphasized that "solutions to the problem of urban disinvestment are
going to come at the local and state level."'150 The report further
clarified that even where a state disclosure act was stricter than the
federal requirements under HMDA, federally chartered financial in-
stitutions must comply with the state laws and regulations.' 5'
The bill, however, was amended in the House of Representatives in
response to the conference committee's fear that "subjecting a Feder-
ally chartered institution to state law would threaten the dual banking
system.' ' 152 As amended, the bill expressly provides an exemption
limited solely to state institutions. Federally chartered lenders, on the
other hand, cannot be exempted from the HMDA. The Glen Ellyn
court focused primarily on this legislative history and utilized an
occupation approach to the preemption issue. The Illinois Supreme
Court noted that the Senate agreed, although reluctantly, to accept
the House version of the HMDA.15 3 Thus the court concluded that
Congress preempted the field of loan reporting procedures.
Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v. Stein, 154 also
raised the question of whether a state government could institute
reporting procedures for federal savings and loans. California's Hous-
ing and Financial Discrimination Act of 1977 (the Holden Act) pro-
hibited redlining. 155 After its enactment, the California Secretary of
Business and Transportation notified all savings and loans that they
should begin compliance with the state procedures. The Federal
Home Loan Bank Board instructed the federal associations that they
need not comply with the state law and suit was initiated by a group
representing those institutions to settle the dispute. The Ninth Circuit
held that there was no room for state regulation of reporting proce-
dures of federally chartered savings and loans. 56 Instead of limiting its
analysis to the HMDA as did the Glen Ellyn court, the Ninth Circuit
examined the entire regulatory scheme relating to savings and loans,
emphasizing HOLA and the FHLBB's extensive powers granted by
150. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975).
151. Id. See also S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
152. H. CONF. RaP. No. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). See note 53 supra &
note 174 infra.
153. 71111. 2d at 500, 377 N.E.2d at 4 (citing H. CONF. Rio'. No. 726, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1975)).
154. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
155. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
156. 604 F.2d at 1260. The court stated: "In our judgment the regulatory control
of the Bank Board over federal savings and loan associations is so pervasive as to leave
no room for state regulatory control." Id.
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HOLA. The court described those regulations as covering all aspects
of every federal savings and loan "from its cradle to its corporate
grave." 157
The Ninth Circuit also contrasted the HMDA with the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act. 158 Devised to prohibit discrimination in the
extension of credit, the ECOA specifically provides that similar rights
granted by state legislation are not federally preempted. 59 This defer-
ral provision is diametrically opposed to the corresponding provision
in the HMDA. The intent behind the ECOA provision was to enhance
the protections afforded to a credit applicant by subjecting both feder-
ally and state chartered institutions to state laws. 0 Consequently, the
statute functions as an enabling law, permitting the states to expand
upon those rights and to regulate all lenders within its borders. This
provision substantiates the theory that when Congress intends state
laws to supersede a federal regulatory scheme, it will expressly include
language to that effect.' 16 In the absence of an explicit provision, the
courts will not arbitrarily infer such congressional intent. 16 2 In effect,
the Stein court found that the FHLBB has extensive regulatory powers
which preempt state law unless a contrary intent not to preempt is
manifested. The result of Glen Ellyn and Stein is that a state may not
impose procedural requirements on federally chartered savings and
loans with respect to their mortgage lending practices.
This conflict between state and federal laws permeates the real
estate finance field. 6 3 Under a limited number of circumstances, state
157. Id. (quoting California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316
(S.D. Cal. 1951)).
158. Id. at 1258. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) is discussed at notes
63-66 supra and accompanying text.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (1976). Congress expressly stated: The Committee
intends that those state laws which give greater protection to the applicant, as
determined by the Board, shall apply equally to all credit granting institutions doing
business in that state." 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 414.
160. 604 F.2d 1256, 1258. The court indicated that this language represents
congressional intent that the federal act "shall not result in federal preemption of
similar rights granted by state statutes." Id. Furthermore, this language promotes
uniformity within the state; encourages the state to promulgate more stringent laws
to combat redlining; and it does not harm the dual banking system. This arrange-
ment permits a local problem-redlining-to be treated by locally- devised laws.
Essentially, the ECOA sets forth the minimum rights to which a credit applicant is
entitled. States may expand upon those rights.
161. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D.
Ark. 1982) (state law prohibiting use of mortgage acceleration, or due-on-sale,
clauses inapplicable to federal savings and loans); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
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laws have been determined to be applicable to federal savings and
loans. 16 4 The general rule, however, is to the contrary. A majority of
circuit courts has concluded that the federal government has pre-
empted the field with regard to federally chartered savings and
loans. 16 5 In People v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Association, 16
the California State Attorney General brought an action to seek mone-
tary penalties against a federal savings and loan association. The State
contended that the institution had violated a California regulation on
advertising standards. The court, citing HOLA, refused to subject the
association to state law, reasoning that since HOLA empowered the
Board to create, operate and supervise federal savings and loans, this
entire field was occupied, leaving no room for state supervision. 1 7
Following the reasoning set forth in Coast Federal, other courts
have held that Congress intended comprehensive federal regulation of
nationally chartered savings and loans. 6 8 With respect to savings and
Norwood Realty Co., 212 Ga. 524, 93 S.E.2d 763 (1956) (state usury laws inapplica-
ble to loans made by federal savings and loans within that state).
164. See, e.g., Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651
F.2d 259, 266 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 350 (1982) (Board's authority
is restricted to the internal management of savings and loan associations and disputed
loan agreement provisions are outside the scope of the Board's power); Shea v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 439 A.2d 997, 1004-05 (Conn. 1981) (state anti-trust laws
held applicable to federal savings and loan); Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051
(1978) (FHLBB regulation permitting savings and loans to maintain reserve accounts
for tax and insurance payments does not preempt state statute requiring interest on
those accounts).
165. The general principle that the Board's authority is plenary and the Board has
exercised its powers through all-embracing regulations covering all aspects of bank-
ing has been adopted widely. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 446 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (federal preemption in the field of
unfair competition); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F.
Supp. 819, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (federal preemption in the areas of director's fiduci-
ary obligations and of association's authority to sell insurance); City Fed. Sav. &
& Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 658 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (federal preemp-
tion in the area of director's fiduciary duties). See also Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (thorough discussion of the history of
HOLA and subsequent cases construing it).
166. 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
167. Id. at 316. The court stated: "Congress expressly delegated the duty and
authority to the Board to make policy .... No provision is made for sharing the
Board's delegated authority with state regulatory or supervisory agencies." Id.
168. For example, significant controversy exists over whether federal institutions
may be subjected to state laws concerning the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. A
due-on-sale provision is an accelerator provision whereby a bank is entitled to de-
mand the entire sum of the mortgage due and payable upon the sale or transfer of
title to the mortgaged property. The purchaser is precluded from assuming the first
mortgage. While federal law permits the use of a due-on-sale clause, 12 C.F.R. §
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loans, state regulation might seem to be precluded because under
HOLA the Board was conferred with plenary powers, 6 9 evidencing
congressional intent to preempt. However, an examination of the
many cases in which courts have determined that Congress preempted
the field of depository institutions reveals that the actual holdings of
these cases narrowly define the preempted area. In fact, the preemp-
tion doctrine is carefully applied in a precise and limited fashion on a
case-by-case basis.170
545.8-3f (1982), some states prohibit their use or enforcement. See, e.g., Patton v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978) (due-on-sale
provision cannot be enforced unless the federally chartered bank can show that its
security is jeopardized by the transfer of the property).
Other courts assessing the issue of federal preemption in the area of due-on-sale
clauses have also held that the entire field of regulation of federally chartered savings
and loans had been preempted by HOLA. See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (granting partial summary judgment for
plaintiff); 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (final judgment entered for plaintiff),
rev'd and remanded, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981).
169. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 167 supra. While many of these cases suggest that Congress has
completely preempted the field of federal savings and loan associations, the ultimate
holdings narrowly define the preempted area.
In Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a FHLBB regula-
tion, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3f (1982), which permitted savings and loans to use and
exercise due-on-sale clauses preempted a California doctrine of law which generally
prohibited the enforcement of due-on-sale provisions. 102 S. Ct. at 3023. See note
168 supra for an explanation of due-on-sale clauses. The Court framed the issue as
whether the Board intended to preempt the state law and if so, whether that action
was within the scope of the Board's delegated authority. 102 S. Ct. at 3025. Writing
for the majority, Justice Blackmun determined that the FHLBB's preamble to the
regulation expressed a clear intent to preempt state law. Id. at 3019. The preamble
can be found at 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286-18,287 (1976). The preamble states that due-on-
sale clauses shall be governed exclusively and solely by the Board. 41 Fed. Reg.
18,286.
The Court evaluated HOLA and concluded that Congress had given the Board
plenary authority. Nevertheless the holding was extremely narrow. The Court de-
clined to decide whether HOLA or the Board's regulations occupied either the field
of due-on-sale clauses or the field of savings and loan supervision. 102 S. Ct. at 3025
n.14. Justice Blackmun opined: "in this case we do not need to explore the outer
limits of the Board's discretion." Id. at 3029.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Board's power is
not limitless. Id. at 3031-32. In vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist stressed that
"there is no indication in the FHLBA that the Board may, by promulgating regula-
tions, preempt state laws that are deemed to be economically unsound." Id.; see also
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Ark. 1982)
(narrowly focused on state and federal laws in question); First Fed. Sav. & Loan v.
Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (court declined to hold that federal
regulations preempted every aspect of state control of federal savings and loans);
Meyers v. Beverly Hills Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974) (prepay-
ment penalties); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F.
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The most important example of this narrow application of the
preemption doctrine is a recent Third Circuit case involving a com-
mercial bank-National State Bank v. Long.7 ' Long involved a suit
alleging that the application of New Jersey's anti-redlining law 72 to
the plaintiff national banks violated the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. The New Jersey statute consisted of two
subdivisions-a procedural provision and a substantive provision-
which the Third Circuit analyzed individually.
The procedural aspect of the New Jersey law required the reporting
of certain lending statistics to the state banking authorities. The chal-
lenge to this facet of the statute was identical to the Stein and Glen
Ellyn cases. ' 73 The court examined the legislative history of the federal
disclosure procedural requisites to determine whether Congress in-
tended preemption of state reporting regulations. Citing the discus-
sion in Glen Ellyn, the Third Circuit noted that the Senate had
acceded to the House's contention that subjecting federal institutions
to state regulation would threaten the dual banking system. 174 Thus,
the court refused to apply state disclosure laws to federal institutions.
Supp. 210 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (unfair competition claims between two federal associa-
tions arising from similarity of names); Greenwald v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
446 F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass. 1978) (regulation of interest payments); Rettig v.
Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (control
of internal management); Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.,
377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (branch banking); Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (right of inspection of membership
lists); Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976)
(regulation of lending practices).
171. 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'g and modifying 469 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.J.
1979).
172. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F-4(f)(6) (West Supp. 1982-1983); see notes 89-95
supra and accompanying text.
173. In each of these three cases the respective states sought to subject the federally
chartered institution to state statutory reporting procedures. Although Glen Ellyn
and Stein involved savings and loan associations and Long involved a commercial
bank, the court approached the issues in a similar fashion. The Third Circuit noted,
however, that banking has been subject to dual control since 1863. 630 F.2d at 985.
174. Id. at 986. Significantly, the senate members of the conference committee
added the caveat that they acceded only "with the understanding that the program
goes only to the narrow area of geographical disclosure of mortgage lending statis-
tics." Id. (quoting H. CONF. REI'. No. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1975)).
The Senate conferees regarded this federal preemption as an exception to the
preemption provisions in other consumer finance laws. The division in viewpoint was
attributed to the divergent perceptions of the HMDA's purpose. The Senate intended
to obligate lenders to service their communities. On the other hand, the House
perceived the HMDA as a tool to enable citizens to determine whether depository
institutions were fulfilling their general obligations. H. CONF. REP. No. 726, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1975).
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The nationally chartered banks also challenged the applicability of
the New Jersey statute's substantive prohibition against redlining. 175
Addressing this challenge, the court framed the issue as whether
Congress intended to limit the preemption to procedural disclosure
requirements.17 It should be noted that no federal statute applicable
to banks expressly prohibits the practice of redlining a community.
While the FHLBB, which governs federally chartered savings and
loans, has issued extensive anti-redlining regulations, 177 the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, which governs federally chartered banks, has not.
The Third Circuit characterized the New Jersey substantive provision
as a "supplementary" law which did not conflict with the federal
laws. 17 8 Furthermore, the court stated that national banks, unlike
savings and loans, are subject to state laws unless the state statute
conflicts with federal law, frustrates the purpose of the national
banks, or impairs the efficiency of national banks to discharge the
duties imposed on them by federal law. 179 Determining that none of
these exceptions applied in the case of redlining prohibitions, the court
concluded that the substantive provisions of the anti-redlining statute
validly applied to national banks in New Jersey. 180 The administration
of this state law vis-a-vis the national banks, however, would not rest
in the hands of the state authorities. The court held that enforcement
authority lies exclusively in the federal agency responsible for the
institution.' 18 The Third Circuit noted that the Stein Court had ex-
pressly declined to address the issue of substantive rights, 182 ruling
175. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16F-3(a) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
176. 630 F.2d at 986.
177. See notes 42 & 67 supra.
178. 630 F.2d at 986.
179. Id. at 985 (citing McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347 (1896)).
180. Id. at 987.
181. Id. at 988. The court stated:
The requirements imposed on national banks by the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act and the Community Reinvestment Act are closely allied
with the state's flat prohibition against redlining. The regulations enacted
by the Comptroller [of Currency] supplementing those two acts serve to
further the interests of uniformity and national application. To allow
enforcement of the anti-redlining provisions by state officials with accom-
panying variations on the federal disclosure requirements simply would
result in unnecessary and wasteful duplications of effort on the part of the
bank and the state agency. From that standpoint enforcement exclusivity
in the federal agency is reasonable and practical.
Id.
182. Id. at 989. In Stein the court clarified the issues presented and concluded:
The state act and the regulations of the Bank Board can be divided into
two groups. First are the substantive nondiscrimination provisions-those
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only on the procedural regulations. Thus the decision in Long is
ostensibly consistent with existing case law.
The practical result of the Long decision is that since national banks
are subject to the state enacted substantive anti-redlining legislation,
there is uniformity among banks with in New Jersey. However, the
question of whether federal savings and loans will be subjected to state
enacted substantive anti-redlining laws remains unsettled. No court
has had the opportunity to address this issue. The proper resolution of
this gap in the case law is to apply Long to federal savings and loans.
Essentially, Long stands for the proposition that both federally and
locally chartered banks will be subject to state substantive anti-redlin-
ing laws. This conclusion was based on two rationales: (1) tradition-
ally banks have been subject to dual-federal and state-control; and (2)
no federally enacted substantive anti-redlining law applicable to
banks existed.
Although the FHLBB has issued a regulation prohibiting the prac-
tice of redlining, there is no congressional intent to preempt state
substantive anti-redlining laws applicable to savings and loans. Addi-
tionally, state enacted substantive provisions would be compatible
with this Board regulation and would not threaten the dual system.
Moreover, there is authority that where the area to be regulated is
outside of the internal management of savings and loans, Board issued
regulations do not preempt state law.183 Furthermore, no preemption
problem exists because no court has addressed this specific issue.
Therefore, co-existence of both state and federal substantive anti-
redlining laws is a permissible and powerful deterrent.
V. Conclusion
In those urban areas where the redlining problem is most acute,
local legislatures are best equipped to alleviate the discrimination
problem. Uniformity within a state among both federally and locally
chartered lending institutions is highly desirable. Toward that end,
states should enact substantive anti-redlining laws. Laws designed to
conferring substantive rights upon borrowers. . . . No dispute presently
exists as to those. . . . Whether preemption exists as to them is a question
we need not and do not reach.
604 F.2d at 1260.
183. In Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 350 (1982) the court held that the Board's
authority is limited to the internal management of savings and loans; therefore,
certain loan agreement provisions are outside the scope of the Board's power. Id. at
266.
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end discrimination and to assist urban renewal constitute a minimal
incursion into the federal domain. No undue burden is placed on the
dual banking system. The actual management of the financial institu-
tion remains undisturbed. Enforcement of the substantive prohibi-
tions may be delegated to the appropriate federal agency.
In light of the Third Circuit's determination in Long, substantive
anti-redlining laws should apply uniformly to state and national banks
and savings and loan associations. State laws could not conceivably
conflict with the existing Board regulation which simply prohibits
mortgage discrimination on the basis of geographic location. More-
over, there exists no congressional intent to occupy this field. Thus
there is no preemption. Therefore, states should be permitted to enact
substantive anti-redlining statutes to ensure the future of urban resi-
dential communities.

